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Moral Shock and Legal Education
Susan A. Bandes
The concept of “moral shock” describes the sense of outrage that occurs 
when an event or newly acquired information shows that the world is not what 
one had expected.1 Moral shock combines the cognitive, moral, and emotional 
realms. It includes “a visceral, bodily feeling, on a par with vertigo or nausea. 
The prospect of unexpected and sudden changes in one’s surroundings can 
arouse feelings of dread and anger.”2 Dread can paralyze. Anger, on the 
other hand, can be “transformed into moral indignation and outrage toward 
concrete policies and decision makers,”3 and toward a rethinking of one’s 
moral principles. 
For my criminal procedure students, as for much of the nation, the events 
collectively known as “Ferguson,”4 as well as the dashcam and bodycam 
and cellphone videos of police encounters with unarmed motorists turning 
deadly, have evoked a powerful moral shock. Moral shock can be transient or 
transformative. What is my role in transforming the moral shock generated by 
Ferguson into something of lasting value?
The day after the Ferguson grand jury declined to indict was a rare kind of 
teaching day. We want our students to be open to new information, eager to 
gain knowledge, passionate about what they learn. On that day my students 
came to class not just open but vulnerable and in pain, not just curious but 
needing answers. They were desperate to understand how this sort of injustice 
could occur, and what could be done to fi x it. They were desperate to be 
reassured that law matters. I have occasionally experienced such teaching 
days, when it felt as if the students were teetering on the edge of an abyss. 
We were far enough into the term to have discussed countless divergences 
between the law on the books and the law in the streets, and we had often 
1. James M. Jasper, Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research, 37 ANN. REV. 
SOC. 285, 289 (2011).
2. Jeff  Goodwin, James M. Jasper & Francesca Polleta, Why Emotions Matter, in PASSIONATE 
POLITICS: EMOTIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 26 (Jeff  Goodwin, James M. Jasper & 
Francesca Polleta eds., 2001).
3. Id.
4. Including, but not limited to, the killing of Michael Brown, the grand jury decision not 
to indict Darren Wilson, and the scathing Department of Justice report on the Ferguson 
criminal justice system.
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considered the inevitable question: “Why should we study these rules if it is so 
easy for the police to get around them or ignore them?” But this felt diff erent. 
Some days it is diffi  cult to convey the malleability and indeterminacy of 
legal rules. Some days it is diffi  cult to convince students that law is more 
than just a series of doctrinal rules they can simply memorize. On that day, it 
was not diffi  cult to move away from the strictures of doctrine—instead, it was 
diffi  cult to convince my students that law matters at all. What my students 
felt was outrage and raw pain. I saw my job that day as fi nding a way to 
acknowledge and honor those feelings without rushing to shape them into 
doctrinal critiques. 
As The New York Times summarized it, “Raw video has thoroughly shaken 
American policing . . . [leading to] nationwide protests, federal investigations 
and changes in policy and attitudes on race.”5 The shock that these videos 
elicit is not universally shared. As Paul Butler observed, “A lot of white people 
are truly shocked by what these videos depict; I know very few African-
Americans who are surprised.”6 It is precisely this chasm that makes the videos 
such a crucial addition to the national conversation on policing. For many, 
these videos are new information. They contradict offi  cial stories that have 
long gone unchallenged. One pernicious characteristic of this type of police 
misconduct and brutality—the one that has permitted it to fl ourish virtually 
unchecked—is precisely that so many people of means, power, and infl uence 
will never experience it7 and, therefore, will dismiss it as improbable, anecdotal, 
or even somehow deserved.8
There are powerful barriers to communicating this information. One barrier 
is simply that the offi  cial version was long the only version communicated to 
the public, and alternative versions were suppressed, belittled, and dismissed. 
Another barrier is that even when accurate information is available, there 
is a relentless drive to portray each death as an isolated incident by a lone, 
rogue offi  cial—and moreover as an incident that would have been avoided 
if only the decedent had “followed the law.”9 This dynamic has been all too 
evident as the circumstances of the deaths of Eric Garner and Tamir Rice and 
5. Damien Cave & Rochelle Oliver, The Videos that Are Putting Race and Policing into Sharp 
Relief, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2015, updated Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2015/07/30/us/police-videos-race.html.
6. Id.
7. And that subset of people who are unlikely to experience this type of police-citizen 
encounter includes most Justices on our current Supreme Court. See Cristian Farias, The 
Chief Justice Has Never Been Pulled Over in His Life, SLATE (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/02/chief_justice_john_roberts_has_
never_been_pulled_over_rodriguez_v_united.html.
8. See generally Susan A. Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 
1275 (1999).
9. See, e.g., Andrew Kirell, 9 Cable News Pundits Who Blame Eric Garner for His Death, MEDIAITE (Dec. 5, 
2014, 11:48 AM) http://www.mediaite.com/tv/9-cable-news-pundits-who-blame-eric-garner
-for-his-death/.
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Walter Scott and Freddie Gray and Sandra Bland and Samuel Dubose and 
so many others have come to light. In each case, even in the face of contrary 
evidence, eff orts were made to portray these encounters as the products of 
rogue cops and blameworthy victims. Such narratives have long been readily 
accepted, and not only because the “rotten apple” narrative is self-protective 
for police departments and other offi  cial entities. Their power also derives 
from a deeply rooted desire to believe that the world is just10 and that the 
police are upstanding,11 and that it is in our control to avoid fates like Bland’s 
and DuBose’s as long as we follow the rules. 
Barriers aside, much of this information has been available for a long 
time, and the power of the Darren Wilson verdict and the videos cannot be 
explained entirely as the function of new information. I, like many of my 
colleagues who teach criminal procedure, have talked to my students for years 
about the problems of pretextual stops, the disparate impact of stop-and-frisk 
on minority communities, and many of the other issues raised by police-citizen 
encounters. But there has always been the question of how to make these 
issues visceral—how to evoke the moral shock they deserve. The videos have 
an impact that simply cannot be elicited by words.12
For many years I told my criminal procedure students that their attitudes 
toward the doctrines constraining the police power would depend on whether 
they believed that the police power would ever be misused against them or 
those they care about. This was meant as a call to summon a certain kind 
of empathy—the understanding that abuse of police power is not something 
that happens only to some “criminal class” that exists far from our realm of 
concern. But as I began studying police brutality in the late 1990s, in the 
wake of the Abner Louima and Amadou Diallo cases and the Chicago police 
torture scandal, I began to understand that empathy based on the likelihood 
of shared experience would not be suffi  cient. It is important to convey that 
police intrusion cannot be avoided simply by avoiding criminal behavior, and 
that “criminal behavior” is a capacious and unstable category that does not 
merely encompass violent felonies. But that is not enough. It is also essential 
to communicate that, for many students, extrapolating from their own 
experience and the experiences of their friends and family members leads to a 
very skewed notion of policing—one that ignores what is essentially a separate 
system of policing for minority communities.
The looming question, in short, is how to make visceral an experience that 
is alien to the lives of many law students. It is not enough to talk about drug 
testing, roadblocks, airport searches, run-of-the-mill traffi  c citations, and the 
10. See ERWIN STAUB, THE ROOTS OF EVIL: THE ORIGINS OF GENOCIDE AND OTHER GROUP 
VIOLENCE 79 (1989); Bandes, supra note 8, at 1319.
11. Bandes, supra note 8, at 1332-33.
12. The issue of how and what videos communicate—their power, their ability to make information 
vivid, their authority (whether earned or unearned)—is a complex and fascinating topic in its 
own right. See Susan A. Bandes & Jessica M. Salerno, Emotion, Proof and Prejudice: The Cognitive 
Science of Gruesome Photos and Victim Impact Statements, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003 (2014).
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other sorts of police actions that most frequently intersect with the lives of 
privileged, non-minority students. Such examples fail to convey the terror and 
intensity of experiencing the sorts of demeaning, escalating, violent traffi  c 
stops these videos document. They fail to convey the experience of living in 
pervasive fear of being stopped; the urgent need to teach one’s children at 
an early age how to behave during a police encounter; the awareness that a 
seemingly innocuous encounter can quickly turn deadly. 
For years I cited statistics. I showed fi lms about Driving While Black. I 
encouraged students to tell their own stories. Some of these stories were the 
most eff ective teaching tool I had—students gut-punched with the realization 
that unwarranted police brutality could be visited on their own friends, 
classmates and colleagues, or members of their classmates’ families.13 And 
fi nally, we have gained access to the videos—the cellphone videos, the dashcam 
and bodycam videos—what Paul Butler calls “the C-SPAN of the streets.”14 
Not only do they contradict the offi  cial story time and time again; they open a 
vivid window onto what is, for many, an entirely separate reality. 
The fall semester of 2014 began in late August, a few weeks after Darren 
Wilson killed Michael Brown. Then in late September, just over the border 
from Chicago in Hammond, Indiana, police pulled over a car containing an 
African-American family, and ticketed the driver for failure to wear a seat belt. 
They then, for no discernible reason and with no legal justifi cation, demanded 
identifi cation from the driver’s husband, Jamal Jones, who was sitting in the 
passenger seat. The encounter quickly escalated as the police pulled a gun, the 
terrifi ed passenger refused to exit the car, and the offi  cer broke the window, 
tased him, and pulled him out of the car through the window. The couple’s 
fourteen-year-old son in the back seat fi lmed the encounter on his cellphone as 
shattered glass fi lled the passenger compartment and he and his seven-year-old 
sister screamed in terror. In early October, the couple fi led suit, and a video 
of the encounter was released. In horror, we watched the video in class. We 
discussed the civil suit fi led by the family and the pending FBI investigation. 
On November 24th, we heard that the FBI investigation had been closed.15 
13. After one such incident, a white student transformed overnight from the disengaged young 
man at the back of the classroom into a fi rebrand determined to litigate police brutality 
cases, after his brief foray into Overtown, Miami (a low-income, predominantly black 
neighborhood), to pick up a change of clothes for an African-American friend led to the 
appearance of fi ve police cars and a complete search of his car at gunpoint—a car which 
contained no contraband. The day after the encounter, the student asked to address the 
class. As he communicated to us quite powerfully, he had come to understand viscerally the 
limits of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.
14. Police Video, “C-Span Of The Streets,” Seen Eroding Confi dence In Offi  cers, CRIME REP. (July 31, 2015, 9:27 AM), 
http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/crime-and-justice-news/2015-07-police-video-feature-
nyt.
15. This was soon revealed to be an erroneous statement by the mayor of Hammond, who 
subsequently issued a correction, stating that the federal investigation is ongoing. Charlie 
Wojciechowski, Mayor: FBI Still Investigating Hammond Stun Gun Case, NBC CHICAGO (Oct. 7, 
2014), http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/hammond-police-lawsuit-283838961.html. 
Nevertheless, the offi  cers involved were swiftly reinstated. Ben Mathis-Lilley, Police Who 
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The following day, the grand jury decision in the Darren Wilson case was 
announced. My class met shortly after we learned that no indictment would 
issue. Their reactions included confusion, a sense of betrayal, and outrage.
We had a useful discussion about the ways in which prosecutor Robert P. 
McCulloch’s approach in Wilson’s case was unusual, how it deviated from the 
norm. We discussed his decision to bombard the grand jury with information 
while withholding his own guidance on which information was important; 
his failure to intervene or weigh in despite the presentation of testimony he 
regarded as false; his failure to ask the grand jury to indict. We discussed 
and critiqued the rules, we discussed the political pressures, we discussed 
the origins and purposes of the grand jury, and we discussed bias—conscious 
and unconscious. This was productive. Students are often resistant to the 
notion of indeterminacy; they are not always open to the idea that historical 
and political and social context shape law. That day these explanations made 
sense, and helped address the need to make sense of what had occurred. But as 
I conducted this discussion, I thought uneasily about the way lawless actions 
and decisions become normalized—about the way it all becomes part of the same 
doctrinal conversation. I thought of Elizabeth Mertz’s ethnographic study of 
the fi rst year of law school, in which she describes an inexorable pressure in 
the classroom toward the normalization of narrow, legalistic evaluations of 
disputes, and away from the use of moral and social frameworks.16
It goes without saying that we need to help our students learn how to 
read closely and articulate and defend their arguments and place doctrine in 
larger theoretical, social, and political contexts. But it is less often observed 
that we play an important role in modeling and channeling the ways in which 
our students express and manage their emotions—emotions that are closely 
intertwined with moral intuitions and moral reasoning. Often the default 
reaction is to tamp down strong emotions or shift students to a purely cognitive 
realm, but there are serious risks to this approach.17
As I write this essay, we are in the midst of trying to piece together how 
a young African-American woman named Sandra Bland died in a Texas jail 
Shattered Window, Tased Passenger in Viral Traffi  c-Stop Video Were Reinstated, SLATE (Dec. 8, 2014, 
11:48 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2014/12/08/seat_belt_taser_police_
reinstated_hammond_indiana_police_back_on_job.html; Michael Puente, Disbelief by 
Some in Hammond After Accused Cops Are Reinstated, WBEZ  91.5 (Nov. 25. 2014, 4:00 PM), http://
www.wbez.org/news/disbelief-some-hammond-after-accused-cops-are-reinstated-111159.
16. ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 
(2007). See also Mark Tushnet, Renormalizing Bush v. Gore: An Anticipatory Intellectual History, 90 
GEO. L.J. 113 (2001), which correctly predicted that the lawless decision in Bush v. Gore would 
eventually become normalized in accord with the conventions of legal discourse.
17. See generally 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY: EMOTION, BRAIN 
DISORDERS, AND DEVELOPMENT (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2007) on the central role 
emotions play in moral appraisals, and in social cognition more generally. See also Susan 
Bandes, Repression and Denial in Criminal Lawyering, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 339, 386 (2006) 
(discussing the dangers of placing nearly exclusive emphasis on the intellectual aspects of 
legal issues at the expense of morality, ethics, and character).
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three days after being pulled over for failing to signal a lane change.18 It is 
summer, and class has not yet begun. I think about how we might dissect this 
traffi  c stop in my criminal procedure class. We would talk about the litany of 
case law that breaks down a traffi  c stop into so many component parts: the 
fact that failure to signal a lane change actually does provide probable cause 
for a stop and that there is no constitutional bar to converting a simple traffi  c 
stop for failure to signal into a full-blown custodial arrest19; the fact that even 
if the offi  cer is wrong about the legality of the stop, his mistake of law may 
be excused if it is “reasonable”20; the fact that, assuming the stop is still in 
progress, probable cause also allows the offi  cer to order the driver (or even the 
passenger) to step out of the car, regardless of whether there is any good reason 
for such an order.21 We could debate whether the stop was still in progress when 
Sandra Bland refused to extinguish her cigarette and then refused to exit the 
car.22 We could talk about the Supreme Court’s parsimonious interpretation 
of the concerns of the Fourth Amendment. We would certainly observe that 
the issue of how the motorist is treated—the lack of respect, the assault on 
dignity—is rarely addressed in Fourth Amendment law, and that the issue of 
whether the motorist’s race led to the stop or aff ected the nature of the stop is, 
according to the Supreme Court, not a Fourth Amendment issue at all.23 We 
have debated and critiqued this case law time and again, and I would have 
said that I understood these problems fully. Nevertheless, as I write this in 
the immediate wake of the deaths of Samuel Dubose and Sandra Bland, the 
doctrinal debate feels like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. At this 
point, the Fourth Amendment cases we dissect year after year strike me as little 
more than a legal veneer legitimating racially discriminatory police brutality 
and violence.
The foundational cases that constitutionalized criminal procedure did not 
acknowledge their own origins—they were responses to racial inequality and 
injustice but rarely mentioned race explicitly.24 It is possible to teach an entire 
course on criminal procedure without acknowledging that we still have, today, 
two separate sets of rules governing police-citizen encounters. Although some 
aspects of this racial chasm can be conveyed through our usual doctrinal tools, 
18. I am still writing as this story is joined by another—the video of Samuel DuBose shot fatally 
in the head by a campus cop who pulled him over because his car had no front license plate.
19. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
20. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 532 (2014). See also Ken Armstrong, How 
the Supreme Court Made It Legal for Cops to Pull You Over for Just About Anything, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Aug. 3, 2015, 11:43 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/03/
how-the-supreme-court-made-it-legal-for-cops-to-pull-you-over-for-just-about-anything.
21. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997); Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
22. Likely not, since the ticket had already been written. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 
1609, 1610 (2014).
23. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
24. See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
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one problem confronting criminal procedure teachers is the very scope of the 
fi eld. Criminal procedure is a constitutional course that focuses mainly on 
individual rights and remedies. Its canon has little to say about the law as 
an instrument of social control. That is left to criminology and sociology.25 
It has little to say about the impact of policing on predominantly minority 
communities. Many of the remedial options that address systemic racial bias, 
such as Section 1983 suits under the Fourteenth Amendment or federal pattern 
and practice suits brought by the Department of Justice, are addressed only 
briefl y. Although the course focuses largely on the courts, and especially 
the Supreme Court, most of the promising solutions to racial disparity and 
misconduct in policing lie outside the courtroom.26
One response is to widen the curricular lens. Many of the most eff ective 
exchanges I have had with students about core legal concepts like justice, 
fairness and inequality have taken place in seminars and other courses that 
eschew casebooks and doctrinal texts. The most powerful have involved 
narrative texts, fi ction or nonfi ction.27 Next spring, I will teach a criminal 
procedure seminar that focuses on the policing of minority communities. We 
will read, among others, Jill Leovy’s Ghettoside,28 Alice Goff man’s On the Run,29 
Steve Bogira’s Courtroom 302,30 Claudia Rankine’s Citizen,31 Michelle Alexander’s 
The New Jim Crow,32 and Ta-Nehisi Coates’ Between the World and Me,33 as well as 
25. See Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, and the Small World of Legal Scholars, 
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 521 (1992); Eric J. Miller, Putting the Practice into Theory, 7 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 31 (2009); Susan Bandes, Parallel Play: The Disconnect Between Criminal 
Procedure and Criminology Revisited, JOTWELL (Dec. 17, 2009), http://crim.jotwell.com/
parallel-play-the-disconnect-between-criminal-procedure-and-criminology-revisited/.
26. To name a few: 1) strengthening police training, screening, and discipline, and the oversight 
of these functions; 2) requiring mandatory reporting of shootings and other uses of police 
force to the FBI; 3) precinct-wide tracking of misconduct and brutality incidents; 4) using 
early warning systems to identify offi  cers whose behavior is problematic and to subject those 
offi  cers to some kind of intervention, often in the form of counseling or training; 5) lowering 
barriers to discovery and dissemination of police misconduct records; 6) strengthening 
federal pattern and practice legislation; 7) addressing the use of arrests or warrants for 
revenue collection; and many more.
27. The course I consider one of my most eff ective is entitled Law, Literature, and Capital 
Punishment. It uses short stories, book chapters, novellas, poetry, memoir, law review 
articles, and other sources to illuminate the experience of those aff ected by the death penalty, 
including defendants, victims’ families, defendants’ families, judges, jurors, prosecutors and 
defense attorneys, wardens, chaplains, and executioners. 
28. JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA (2015).
29. ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2014).
30. STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
COURTHOUSE (2005).
31. CLAUDIA RANKINE, CITIZEN: AN AMERICAN LYRIC (2014).
32. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
33. TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME (2015).
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critiques and commentaries of these texts. Seminars, however, reach only 
a small group of students. My next step is to explore incorporating similar 
narratives into the core course.
Ta-Nehisi Coates talks about coming to view “the gnawing discomfort, the 
chaos, the intellectual vertigo” produced by his education as a “beacon” rather 
than an alarm. He says, “It began to strike me that the point of my education 
was a kind of discomfort,” that “discord, argument, chaos, perhaps even fear” 
were a “kind of power.”34 As I stood before my students on the day we learned 
about the Darren Wilson grand jury verdict, I thought not for the fi rst time 
that the impulse to reassure my students that we can create intellectual order 
out of chaos is something I do for myself as much as for them. Inaugurating 
my students into a world of doctrinal order, in which some doctrines have to 
be tweaked but the framework is sound, in which I am in possession of the 
answers, is reassuring for all of us. But our most powerful legal tools come 
from seeing things as they are, free of comforting myths. 
This terrible moment is a window, an opportunity. If the term “systemic 
injustice” sometimes sounds abstract to my students, the “C-SPAN of the 
streets” has made it concrete. We are confronted with the limits of doctrine, 
and the limits of courts as engines of change, and the ways in which doctrine 
shape-shifts around an enduring status quo. The good news is that we can 
help our students stare into that abyss and come out stronger. It is not my 
job to reassure my students that law makes sense. It is not my job to allay 
my students’ anger. Where—as here—it is appropriate, my job is to help them 
nurture that anger into an abiding moral outrage, and to help them deploy 
their legal education to put that outrage to good use.
34. Id. at 52.
